Psychological Review
Vol. 65, No. 2, 1958

CONFORMITY, STATUS, AND IDIOSYNCRASY CREDIT[1]

E. P. HOLLANDER[2]

Carnegie Institute of Technology

Something of a paradox exists in the prevailing treatments of conformity and status. Students of social psychology are likely to be left with the pat impression that the freely chosen leader conforms to, and perhaps tenaciously upholds, the norms of his group. Yet this kind of leadership is also presented as a status sufficient to provide latitude for directing and altering group norms (11, p. 416). From their recent experimental work in this area, Dittes and Kelley have voiced a doubt that the relationship between conformity and status is ever a simple one (7, p. 106). The evidence favors their assertion.

Although these phenomena may be treated as discrete entities, they both arise from interaction between an individual and a set of relevant other individuals constituting a group. To say that an individual conforms, or that he has status, is not to say that these are independently determined states nor that they are terminal; they have some common origin in a phenomenal relationship which persists over time. Conformity and status may be thought of therefore as mutually dependent, and transitionally effective upon subsequent interactions. With this as a framework, several general conceptions will be expressed here regarding mechanisms which produce these phenomena and govern their relationship to one another.

In a gross way, three classes of variables, or elements, are necessary to this conceptual scheme: characteristics of the individual himself; characteristics of the group with which he interacts; and outcomes of interaction representing a past history which may alter the relationship of the former elements.

Of particular importance as a mediating process is the changing perception brought about in the individual and the group by their interaction; the third element is, in effect, this process. A distinction is required, therefore, between the phenomenal and perceptual features of behavior. An individual's behavior is not only phenomenally present in interaction but is also subject to view and appraisal by the other members of the group. If there are to be consequences involving these others, it is essential that there be a perceptual intake on their part. And so too must the individual perceive a group norm; the fact that it is manifestly there is not enough.

It is worth emphasizing that the focus here is upon how the individual fares in the group rather than upon more global consequences to the group. Two kinds of interlocking mechanisms are of concern: those giving rise to behavior in conformity with group demands, and those giving rise to status. The issues

[1] A paper derived from this material was presented at the 1957 International Congress of Psychology in Brussels, Belgium. Thanks are due to the overseers of the Group Psychology Branch of the Office of Naval Research for their encouragement and support of this work under ONR Contract 1849 (00). As usual, the views expressed are those of the author and are not to be construed as necessarily reflecting those of the Navy Department.

No theoretical conception exists in isolation. Grateful acknowledgment is extended to T. M. Newcomb, whose work has been a particular stimulus, and to J. F. Muth and H. A. Simon for their critical review of concepts and presentation. For any inelegancies of formulation or errors of content which appear, the author alone is responsible.

[2] On leave 1957–58 as Fulbright Lecturer in Psychology, Faculty of Letters, Istanbul University, Istanbul, Turkey.

at stake may be put simply as follows: What produces conformity? And what allows for nonconformity?

SOME QUESTIONS ON CONFORMITY

Fundamental to these issues is the matter of determining *when* an individual may be said to be conforming. One may note that a twofold assumption underpins the usual view of conformity, i.e., that the individual is aware of the existence of a given group norm, and that his behavior in accordance with this norm is evidence of conformity. It is doubtful that both features of this assumption necessarily hold simultaneously. This being so, difficulties of interpretation will arise. If the individual were to be insensitive to the norm he could hardly be said to be conforming to it, whatever his behavior seemed to betray; correspondingly, a kind of "conformity" might prevail in terms of adherence to an incorrectly perceived norm; and thus, an evident failure to conform might or might not be "nonconformity" depending upon the accuracy of the individual's perception of the norm in the first place.

A related question concerns the individual's motivation. Is there a motive for nonconformity identifiable? Insofar as they are distinguishable, is it necessarily so, after all, that a conflict obtains between the individual's dispositions and the group's demands? Since behavior is taken to be more than a random event, the motivation for instances of conformity or nonconformity should be accountable, once the presence of an adequate recognition of the norm is established.

There remains too the question of who perceives a given behavior to be conforming, i.e., an external observer, a group member, or the actor himself. Employing a fixed-norm baseline for observation, as is often done, serves to obscure differential expectations which render conforming behavior for one individual nonconforming for another—with regard, that is, to others' perceptions *in situ*. Thus, the degree of familiarity with the unique properties of the group context is critical in verifying and understanding conformity.

NORMS, ROLES, AND GROUP EXPECTANCIES

The usual conception of conformity examined here requires some group referent and a standard of behavior abstracted therefrom and defined as a norm. Probably because many studies of groups have involved highly manifest behaviors, norms are conceived to be quite literally evident. On the other hand, in the related concept of role a recognition exists that the behavioral standard may not be manifest, but rather may be an *expectancy*.[3]

Though persisting, the distinction between norms and roles is neither essential nor easy to maintain (cf. **2**, **16**). Roles are normative in that they involve some implicit shared expectancy among group members; and norms themselves, lacking visibility, may nonetheless dwell in expectancies. It is these expectancies, then, which may be normative, in the sense of typicality. Norms and roles are only distinguishable insofar as norms usually imply expectancies applicable to many persons, while roles are expectancies restrictive to one or a very few individuals in a group.

Objective observers might delimit common expectancies appropriate to group members in general from differential expectancies having reference to particular

[3] The term "expectancy" refers to another's perception of some object person (cf. **21**). What the object person then perceives to be the expectancy is quite important, but its locus is first of all in the "other." Reference is not made, therefore, to the term in Tolman's sense.

individuals as such. For the individual in the setting, however, manifest conformity probably comes about without regard to a separate awareness of norms as distinct from roles, but more likely in terms of behaviors which he perceives to be expected of him by relevant others, i.e., "doing the *right* thing."

In the world of daily interaction, the perception an individual holds of what relevant others expect of him is a singularly important determinant of his social behavior; and the degree to which an individual perceives the group to be rewarding serves to enhance or elaborate the effect produced by his motivation to belong. An alternative sequence may be seen to occur as well: motivation having reference to some fulfillment through the group serves to heighten the individual's perception of its expectancies.[4]

INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES

Granted that conformity derives from certain features of individual perception and motivation, it still remains necessary to identify these features more pointedly. In this formulation, there are four such to be noted: perceptual ability (P_a), representing a general alertness to the social stimulus field; perceptual error (P_e), with particular reference to group expectancies; motivation to gain or sustain social approval (M_a); and, motivation to take part in the focal activities of the group (M_g). Taken together, the latter two variables may be considered as the individual's motivation to belong to the group (M).

The perceptual variables can readily be related to personality typologies. Many of these, e.g., authoritarianism, rigidity, or empathy, appear to lend themselves to a reduction to perceptual function as a core element (cf. **1**, **3**, **19**). Terms like "perceptual rigidity," "perceptual defense," and "social imperceptiveness," often appear as concomitants of these broader characterizations; evidently, this element accounts for certain diversities in behavior which distinguish individuals from one another.

It is useful here, however, to recognize a differential between that which is given and that which is emergent, i.e., perceptual ability and perceptual error, though the interaction of the two is not challenged. The distinction basically is that the former serves as a parameter setting the lower limit on the latter. Thus, the minimum level of an individual's P_e is set by his basic capacity, P_a. This should not be taken as neglect of the potentials of learning, however. The concept of capacity introduced here may be understood to be similar to that of cognitive structures (cf. **15**). No assumptions are made about the source of the "capacity"; it is only significant as a feature of the individual which bears upon interaction. It seems reasonable to believe that some individuals have an initial advantage over others as regards accuracy in perceiving group expectancies.

Concerning motivation to belong, mention has already been made that it involves two continua: motivation specific to the activity—or instrumental features—of the group, M_g; and motivation rooted in a generalized need for social approval, M_a. This view cuts across a number of other motivational schema suggested elsewhere (cf. **4**, **8**, **9**, **12**, **23**), and is intended more as a resolution than a departure. Briefly, these other distinctions appear to involve an "activity focus" and an "other people focus." Activity involves others,

[4] The work on selective perception (e.g., **18**) sustains some such formulation, in general. But the linkage between motivation and perception has considerably greater complexity, as Bruner (**5**) has more recently pointed out.

of course, but not necessarily to gain their approval. What really seems to matter is the nature of the reward sought.

The approval variable might be viewed as a parameter of personality, but not one so static as to be unaffected by interaction, within certain limits. Since those members having interests which can only be satisfied through participation in group activity do not of necessity have a high need for social approval, and since those cast into groups of little positive activity valence to them may still require approval, it is possible that these variables may be related negatively or positively, depending upon the circumstances considered.

STATUS EMERGENCE

The foregoing points have concentrated on individual characteristics that absorb and deal with features of the social context. Ultimately, these have consequences in behavior, which in its turn has an impact upon the group. It is appropriate now to consider the implications of this process to the emergence of status.

At bottom, status may be taken to be an outcome of the group's differentiated perception of the individual, leading to a set of particularized expectancies regarding his behavior. This occurs as a function of certain of the behaviors or characteristics evidenced by the individual in interaction, which then yield a reconstruction of the group's perception of him. Cast in these terms, status has special value as a kind of middle ground in relating the individual to the group. It exists in the first place as a feature in someone's perceptual field, for without reference to a perceiver status has no intrinsic value or meaning in itself. And, similarly, role cannot be divorced from its perceptual locus; behavior is only appropriate to status insofar as someone perceives it to be so. Perceptual differentiation by the group has consequences, then, in terms of the behaviors it expects the individual to display.[5]

Though not necessarily the case, it is desirable to conceive of status within this framework as having hierarchical properties on some sort of group-acceptance continuum (cf. 7). This is by no means critical as a feature, but is of heuristic value. Still further, it is convenient to represent status as permitting greater latitude in the manifestation of behaviors which would be seen to be nonconformist for the other members of the group; we refer here to common expectancies, a term introduced earlier. The implications of this aspect of status are of especial relevance to what follows.

IDIOSYNCRASY CREDIT

Status will hereafter be considered to be an outcome of interaction referred to as "idiosyncrasy credit" (C). This represents an accumulation of positively-disposed impressions residing in the perceptions of relevant others; it is defined operationally in terms of the degree to which an individual may deviate from the common expectancies of the group. In this view, each individual within a group—disregarding size and function, for the moment—may be thought of as having a degree of group-awarded credits such as to permit idiosyncratic behavior in certain dimensions *before* group sanctions are applied. By definition, affiliation with the group—as perceived by the group—ceases when the individual's credit balance reaches zero.

[5] Implicit here is a concern with observable features of the individual. Thus, in the case of conformity, public manifestation is required; another position, taking account of both public and private conformity, has been advanced by Jahoda (Marie Jahoda. "Conformity and Independence: A Psychological Analysis." Unpublished, June, 1956).

It is noteworthy that this concept is applicable to the limited, artificially produced laboratory group as well as to the total society. And, since the individual may have simultaneous membership in many groups, he may be considered to have a distinct credit balance in all groups with which he is in some sense involved; in each case he has achieved some level of status. Affixed to this concept of "credit" is the further consideration that "debits" of varying magnitudes may be charged against the credit balance, depending upon the gravity and frequency of the idiosyncrasy manifested, and the credit level which the individual holds.[6]

Taking our society today as an illustration, one's credit balance very likely will be rapidly exhausted by publicly espousing Communist doctrine. In a different sphere, a fraternity man may experience comparable rejection by his peers for growing a beard, though other factors would come into play, so that for some individuals the consequences—in terms of group sanctions—would be disastrous and for others hardly disturbing. This requires some consideration of factors which determine the awarding of credit.

Among other determinants, the credit balance that a group member achieves depends upon the group, its function, and other properties to be considered below. It is useful for our purposes here to conceive of an "open system," i.e., an autonomous group providing focal activities, as well as free face-to-face interaction yielding expectancies; this would permit the simultaneous observation of an individual's behavior by all group members and the generation of impressions representing credit.

There are three general variables which can be delineated as determinants of these impressions. The first of these is alpha value (V_α), referring to the individual's task competence or performance in regard to focal group activities; the second is beta value (V_β), referring to characteristics of the individual not specific to these activities, e.g., status in a broader group, *bonhomie,* and the like; the third is immediate past idiosyncratic behavior (B), constituting a drain on credits.[7] It is not contended that credit is necessarily related linearly to these variables, nor is their very likely interrelationship ignored. They are doubtless intercorrelated, though of varying degrees of significance in generating or dissipating credits. As a generalization, value (V) tends to increase credit while idiosyncratic behavior (B) acts to decrease credit—though the potential for negative value exists, e.g., in the case of prejudice.

GROUP VARIABLES

From the foregoing it should be apparent that an individual can only be accurate in perceiving expectancies insofar as they are normative, in some modal sense, and are communicated. Two interrelated group variables which have importance in this regard are group attraction (A) and the communicality of any given expectancy (Y).

The former variable may be thought

[6] Alterations upward or downward in credit may be conceived as a negative, monotonic function of credit balance. Thus, for the same idiosyncratic behavior or negative weight attached to value, the individual with high status loses less credit than the marginal individual of low status (cf. **20**).

[7] Still another variable related to credit balance, probably curvilinearly, would be the duration of the individual's affiliation with the group over time. This has been disregarded, since it is useful to deal with individuals as though they have been in the group for an equal period of time, more particularly from its inception. It is also likely that the degree to which the individual is "visible" may alter the effects produced by his value and idiosyncratic behavior.

of as "cohesiveness," a term more usually applied. But since this term may have at least several operational meanings, it is preferable to specify two kinds of literal attraction, or an aggregation of these: attraction to group members, and attraction to focal group activities. This duality follows the M_a and M_g distinction made earlier in connection with motivation to belong. Although one may deal with a nondiscriminate aggregation of these, it is quite true that the sum of individual attractions in the group may be based predominately in M_a needs or M_g needs, and that differences in the emergent characteristics of groups thus constituted will be evident. Thus, where group attraction derives mainly from M_a one might predict it would be more stable than where its source is mainly M_g, since the latter variable is more temporally based.

Communicality is conceived to be directly related to group attraction in a mutual dependency; it refers to the degree to which an expectancy is literally communicated, i.e., made evident, and bears a relationship to both relevance and communication variables, as they have been introduced in other formulations (cf. 6, 22), though this is by no means a complete statement. Studies of leaders' ability to estimate group attitudes, for example, have yielded highly conflicting results (cf. 21, p. 268). Where attitudes are "relevant," leaders *may or may not* be superior to nonleaders in their respective estimates; where leaders *are* found to be superior to nonleaders in estimating relevant attitudes, this has been ascribed to the heightened social sensitivity of leaders or alternatively to the proposition that leaders are instrumental in the shaping of group attitudes and hence tend to know them better.

Whatever the explanation chosen, there is reason to contend that the variable of relevance may not be the most fruitful one for purposes of study. If one were disposed to test the tenability of the hypothesis that leaders have this greater social sensitivity, it would seem desirable not only to raise the question of whether leaders, and others, tend to use their own personal attitudes as an anchorage for estimating group attitudes, but to ask in addition whether this exists independently of the degree to which given attitudes actually are foci of communication within real groups. Another approach, accordingly, might be to utilize some index of the degree to which a specific attitude —or an expectancy—actually evidences itself in a given group. There is utility, then, in introducing the operationalizable property "communicality."

Though a level of communicality may characterize a group, the particular center of interest here resides in a given expectancy. One may venture in this vein that the communicality of an expectancy will be at a lower relative level than that of other expectancies, if it is less applicable to the group as a whole; common expectancies ought to have higher communicality than the differential expectancies associated with increased status. Since communicality rests on behavior, it may be seen to follow, too, that interpersonal interaction results in higher communicality. Through a related mechanism, interpersonal interaction may contribute to group attraction (cf. 11, 17).

SUMMARY OF VARIABLES

For convenience, the variables described may now be set forth definitionally.

B—Idiosyncratic behavior, i.e., any group member's behavior which may be perceived by the group to deviate from a given group expectancy.

C—Idiosyncrasy credit, i.e., the extent to which a given group member's idiosyncratic behavior (B) is allowable, in terms

of gravity and frequency, before group sanctions are applied.

V_α—*Alpha value,* i.e., the weight assigned the current performance of a given individual, which may be perceived by the group as bearing upon its focal activities, e.g., task competence.

V_β—*Beta value,* i.e., the weight assigned the characteristics of a given individual which may be perceived by the group, but are not specific to its current focal activities, e.g., status external to the group.

P_a—The *perceptual ability* of a given individual, in the sense of a capacity to perceive events and relationships in the social field.

P_e—The *perceptual error* of a given individual in perceiving events or relationships in a particular social field, e.g., group expectancies.

M_a—The *motivation* of a given individual to affiliate with a given group, in terms of a gaining or sustaining *social approval.*

M_g—The *motivation* of a given individual to affiliate with a group, in terms of interest in focal *group activity.*

M—Individual motivation to gain or sustain membership, i.e., some composite of a given individual's motivation of both the M_a and M_g variety.

A—In general, *attraction of the group to its members,* i.e., some aggregate of all group members' *M.*

Y—The *communicality of a given group expectancy,* in terms of the degree to which a given expectancy is evident.

SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION

In Fig. 1 our symbolic notation has been employed to represent relationships schematically. Since a sequential pattern is of particular importance, a time dimension is involved throughout; thus, subscripts are introduced to indicate the time interval to which reference is made; e.g., t_1 is read as the first time interval; or, P_{e_2} as perceptual error in the second time interval.

The system originates at the top with group attraction as a motivational context, and three individual variables, perceptual ability, motivation to gain or sustain social approval, and motivation with reference to the group's activity. At the next level, group attraction has given rise to the communicality of certain expectancies which are then perceived by the individual, thus yielding a perceptual error; and motivation to belong has been aggregated at this level, as well. Beta value is also introduced to signify the group's perception of the individual's characteristics, e.g., pleasant appearance.[8]



FIG. 1. Schematic representation of mechanisms demonstrating relationships over time.

Moving down in time, the individual's idiosyncratic behavior during the period just elapsed has been generated by his error in perceiving expectancies together with his motivation—within the constraints imposed by the level of group attraction. The group's percep-

[8] The term "group perception" refers to an abstraction; it is unlikely that all members of a group will perceive a given feature of an individual identically; the intent therefore is only to suggest a modal tendency. However, some very recent research has illuminated just this point and given credence to the general conception of differentially-determined value (cf. 14).

tion of the individual's contribution to its focal activities, alpha value, is influenced by the immediately prior perception of his characteristics, beta value.

In the next stage, status is generated—in the form of group-awarded credits—by the effects of behavior relative to expectancies and the sequence of beta value to alpha value to credits. At this point the full set of interactions are in play, with credits affecting beta value; the latter serving as a repository of group perceptions of the individual's characteristics; perceptual error and motivation are reintroduced for this new phase, with the former affected by communicality of expectancies. Idiosyncratic behavior is subsequently determined by available credits, as this is checked by motivation, in particular, and perceptual error.

Discussion and Implications

Early in interaction, conformity to group expectancies serves to maintain or increase status, particularly as it is seen to be combined with manifest contributions to the group; at a later phase, however, the status thus generated permits greater latitude for idiosyncratic behavior. Thus, if an individual conforms to expectancies early in his exposure to the group and if he shows characteristics of competence, he accrues credits. For evident deviations from expectancies, or poor performance, he loses credits. If he exhausts his credit balance completely, pressures are applied to remove him from the group, or, at the very least, he is no longer perceived to be a member. At the other pole, if he continues to amass credits he attains a threshold permitting deviations from common expectancies, but with constraints imposed by newly differentiated expectancies.

The apparent paradox—that leaders both conform to group norms and yet may act to alter them by an exercise of influence—may be explained by reference to this sequential process. In this regard, it should not be supposed that an abundance of credits must lead perforce to influence. While an individual thus endowed has the potential to display more idiosyncratic behavior than others, he might not do so, nor would he of necessity become a leader thereby. Some further points of clarification are in order.

It is easy enough for the individual to continue to do habitually that which is rewarded by relevant others, so long as expectancies remain relatively stable. Consider the state of affairs which holds, however, in the case of the person who has marked status mobility in the group. He cannot simply continue to redisplay behaviors which were appropriate to the group's earlier expectancies, because the expectancies applicable to him are now altered in keeping with his rising status. Other things being equal, this suggests two features appropriate to the attainment of status in an open system: (*a*) accuracy of social perception; and (*b*) modifiability of behavior. Insofar as the incipient status person is attuned to the altering group expectancies and is capable of reacting appropriately to them, his status will very likely move upward. The relationship of these points to research on leadership is noteworthy; for example, the proposition that leaders have a heightened sensitivity to certain properties of the social context is in consonance with the foregoing. Note, too, that whether or not the leader has actually created a feature of the context with which he is then familiar, he may well have evidenced perceptual accuracy in an earlier phase, as he rose to leadership. Accordingly, the finding of Talland (22) that leaders are only better in judging norms where they have had a part in their evolution is not inconsistent with a finding like that of Chowdhry and Newcomb (6) to the ef-

fect that leaders have superior social perception; it would appear that the time phase under study is critical in yielding one process or the other.

Previously the point was made that the high-status person could effect changes in the common expectancies of the group because he has latitude for the manifestation of what would be seen to be nonconforming behavior for others. But, in contrast, the expectancies regarding the role itself are less amenable to alteration by the incumbent. Hence, the leader could readily lose credits and find his influence diminished if he were to show idiosyncratic behavior in terms of expectancies associated with his role. Regarding such deviation, we may conceive of one requirement which is quite likely significant, i.e., perception by the members of the group that the leader's motivation to belong be both high and sincere. Should this condition not be fulfilled, status may be threatened. To take another illustration, innovation by the leader may be of high valence to the group. It is conceivable that this could yield the seeming anomaly of a leader who, in the face of this expectancy, adopts a passive and ostensibly safe course, but loses status.

Leadership status, therefore, assuredly demands conformity to the group's expectancies regarding the role, but still leaves the leader with sway in the sphere of common expectancies associated with members at large. The leader may deviate from these, or bring about their reconstruction, if his prior activities have generated an appropriately high level of credit.

The motivational aspects of this process require consideration in terms of the individual set against the background of the group's activity. The restraining effect of M on the expenditure of C has been accounted for in the foregoing. What is more to the point, however, is the fact that a person with M_g will more likely achieve status in a largely M_g group than will a person with M_a; the status achieved, therefore, is a part function of the congruence of the individual's motivation with the generalized character of the motivation extant in the group. Since motivation is related, as well, to performance and other characteristics represented by alpha value and beta value, it is to be regarded as a key element.

If the group has a primary focal activity, then presumably M_g becomes more highly valued, particularly in combination with alpha value. At the other extreme, i.e., where the group activities are quite diffuse, M_a becomes important in combination with beta value. We may conceptualize groups of the M_a variety as being essentially "socially minded." With a minimum group-centered function requiring broad participation, the person having beta value is more likely to achieve status through being well liked; in the M_g group, to the contrary, alpha value becomes critical and task competence has greater weight in determining status. The relationship of this to the current situational view of leadership is evident.[9]

Whether group members do distinguish between value of one kind or another can be inferred from the literature of sociometry. Evidence will be found there indicating that individuals can give scaled evaluations of their peers with quite adequate discriminations between those they like, those they consider competent, and so forth. Though these sociometrically based status continua are likely to be related, as we have previously noted, they are by no means in universal, one-to-one correspondence (cf. 10). Viewing status in the aggre-

[9] For example, the finding of Jennings (13) that leadership and popularity are highly related in her groups can be considered in this framework.

gative, credit-amassing sense still allows for the integrity of the roots which feed it. Recent experimental evidence on the basis for shifts in the group's perception of a member also accords with this conception (cf. **14**).

Certain of the assumptions made here —e.g., that an individual will have a level of credit reposing unitarily in others' perceptions of him, and that he may know and make use of the credits at his disposal—are only approximations of reality. Their literal tenability is not crucial to the mechanisms postulated, however. One could argue that the individual operates *as if* these assumptions were in fact true: the "they" commonly invoked to denote the upholders of some social pattern are never quite as homogeneous as the term suggests; but, to the individual, the use of "they" to represent a supposed uniformity is a necessary convenience as a basis for behavior. Furthermore, in accordance with this position, the individual apparently does react differentially to what he believes to be the view of him held by the "they," as Dittes and Kelley (**7**) have demonstrated by manipulating the level of group "acceptance" which an individual is permitted to sense. In general, then, it appears that the individual seeks to know where he stands and does the best he can with the information available to him. These conceptions therefore do no violence to the reality with which the individual deals, but rather describe this reality in terms congruent with his concern.

SUMMARY

Beginning with the consideration that social behavior depends upon attributes of the individual, conditions of the situation, and inputs to a dynamic system arising from their interaction, a theoretical conception relating conformity and status is presented.

The major mediating construct introduced is "idiosyncrasy credit," taken to be an index of status, in the operational sense of permitting deviations from common "expectancies" of the group.

Credits are postulated to increase or decrease as a function of the group's perception of the individual's task performance and generalized characteristics, and of his "idiosyncratic behavior," i.e., deviations from its expectancies. Though increases in credit are seen to permit greater latitude for idiosyncratic behavior, motivational and perceptual states of the individual, and group-level phenomena, are also considered.

REFERENCES

1. ADORNO, T. W., FRENKEL-BRUNSWIK, ELSE, LEVINSON, D. J., & SANFORD, R. N. *The authoritarian personality.* New York: Harper, 1950.
2. BATES, F. L. Position, role and status: A reformulation of concepts. *Soc. Forces,* 1956, **34**, 313–321.
3. BENDER, I. E., & HASTDORF, A. H. On measuring generalized empathic ability (social sensitivity). *J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.,* 1953, **48**, 503–506.
4. BOVARD, E. W. Conformity to social norms and attraction to the group. *Science,* 1953, **118**, 598–599.
5. BRUNER, J. S. On perceptual readiness. *Psychol. Rev.,* 1957, **64**, 123–152.
6. CHOWDHRY, KAMLA, & NEWCOMB, T. M. The relative abilities of leaders and non-leaders to estimate opinions of their own groups. *J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.,* 1952, **47**, 51–57.
7. DITTES, J. E., & KELLEY, H. H. Effects of different conditions of acceptance upon conformity to group norms. *J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.,* 1956, **53**, 100–107.
8. DEUTSCH, M., & GERARD, H. B. A study of normative and informational social influences upon individual judgment. *J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.,* 1955, **51**, 629–636.
9. FESTINGER, L. Informal social communication. *Psychol. Rev.,* 1950, **57**, 271–282.
10. HOLLANDER, E. P., & WEBB, W. B. Leadership, followership, and friendship: An analysis of peer nominations. *J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.,* 1955, **50**, 163–167.

11. HOMANS, G. C. *The human group.* New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950.
12. JACKSON, J. M., & SALTZSTEIN, H. D. *Group membership and conformity processes.* Ann Arbor, Mich.: Research Center for Group Dynamics, 1956.
13. JENNINGS, HELEN H. *Leadership and isolation.* (Rev. ed.) New York: Longmans, Green, 1950.
14. JONES, E. E., & DECHARMS, R. Changes in social perception as a function of the personal relevance of behavior. *Sociometry,* 1957, **20**, 75–85.
15. KRECH, D. Psychological theory and social psychology. In H. Helson (Ed.), *Theoretical foundations of psychology.* New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1951.
16. NEWCOMB, T. M. *Social psychology.* New York: Dryden, 1950.
17. NEWCOMB, T. M. The prediction of interpersonal attraction. *Amer. Psychologist,* 1956, **11**, 575–586.
18. POSTMAN, L., BRUNER, J. S., & MCGINNIES, E. Personal values as selective factors in perception. *J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.,* 1948, **43**, 142–154.
19. ROKEACH, M. Generalized mental rigidity as a factor in ethnocentrism. *J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.,* 1948, **43**, 259–278.
20. SCHACHTER, S. Deviation, rejection, and communication. *J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.,* 1951, **46**, 190–207.
21. STEINER, I. D. Interpersonal behavior as influenced by accuracy of social perception. *Psychol. Rev.,* 1955, **62**, 268–274.
22. TALLAND, G. A. The assessment of group opinion by leaders, and their influence on its formation. *J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.,* 1954, **49**, 431–434.
23. THIBAUT, J. W., & STRICKLAND, L. H. Psychological set and social conformity. *J. Pers.,* 1956, **25**, 115–129.

(Received January 30, 1957)

ERRATUM

In the article "Uncertainty and Conflict: A Point of Contact Between Information-Theory and Behavior-Theory Concepts" by D. E. Berlyne in the November 1957 issue of this Journal (*Psychol. Rev.,* 1957, **64**, 329–339), there are two errors. On p. 332, in Property 5, "$= E_1$" should be substituted for "> 0," and on p. 333, Expression 2 should read "$\Sigma_i E_i(\log(\Sigma_i E_i) - \log E_i)$."